We consider a discrete choice model in which the payoffs to each of an agent's n actions are subjected to the average of m i.i.d. shocks, and use tools from large deviations theory to characterize the rate of decay of the probability of choosing a given suboptimal action as m approaches infinity. Our model includes the multinomial probit model of Myatt and Wallace (2003) as a special case. We show that their formula describing the rates of decay of choice probabilities is incorrect, provide the correct formula, and use our large deviations analysis to provide intuition for the difference between the two.
Introduction
In a paper in this journal, Myatt and Wallace (2003) consider a model of stochastic evolution based on the multinomial probit model. Agents in their model optimize after their payoffs are subjected to i.i.d. normal shocks, and their analysis focuses on the agents' long run behavior as the variance of the shocks is taken to zero. Compared to other models of choice used in stochastic evolutionary game theory, the multinomial probit model introduces a novel feature: the rate of decay in the probability of choosing a suboptimal strategy is neither independent of payoffs, as in the mutation models of Kandori et al. (1993) and Young (1993) , nor dependent only on the gap between its payoff and the optimal strategy's payoff, as in the logit model of Blume (1993) , but can depend on the gaps between its payoff and those of all better performing strategies. 1 The foundation of the analysis in Myatt and Wallace (2003) (henceforth MW) is their Proposition 1, which characterizes the rates of decay of multinomial probit choice probabilities as the shock variance approaches zero. Their characterization is based on a direct evaluation of the limit of the relevant multiple integral. In this note, we introduce a model of choice in which the payoffs to each of an agent's n actions are subject to the average of m i.i.d. shocks. One can interpret this average as representing the net effect of many small payoff disturbances. Our model comes equipped with a natural parameterization of the small noise limit: as the number of shocks grows large, the probability of a suboptimal choice approaches zero. Using techniques from large deviations theory, we derive basic monotonicity and convexity properties of the rates of decay of choice probabilities, and we obtain a simple characterization of the rates themselves.
Since the average of independent normal random variables is itself normally distributed, MW's model of choice can be obtained as a special case of ours. Our analysis reveals that MW's formula for the rate of decay of multinomial probit choice probabilities is incorrect. We derive the correct formula for the rate of decay, and we offer an intuitive explanation for the difference between the formulas using the language of large deviations theory. . The weak law of large numbers tells us thatZ m converges in probability to its mean vector µ ≡ EZ l ∈ R n .
We now explain how methods from large deviations theory can be used to describe the rate of decay of the probability thatZ m lies in a given set U ⊂ R n not containing µ.
Put differently, R is the convex conjugate of the logarithmic moment generating function of Z l . It can be shown that R is a convex, lower semicontinuous, nonnegative function that satisfies R(µ) = 0. Moreover, R is finite, strictly convex, and continuously differentiable on the interior of the support of Z l , and is infinite outside the support of Z l .
2
For simplicity, we henceforth assume that the components of the random vector
It is easy to verify that in this case, the Cramér transform of
, and so satisfies r k (µ k ) = 0.
Example 2.1. Suppose that Z l has a multivariate normal distribution with mean vector 0 and covariance matrix σ 2 I. Then a direct calculation shows that the Cramér transform
Example 2.2. Suppose that the components of Z l are independent, each with an exponential(λ)
Cramér's Theorem states that
Roughly speaking, equation (1) says that the probability thatZ m takes a value in U is of order exp(−m R(z * )) (that is, that the exponential rate of decay of
where z * minimizes the rate function R on the set U. If after a large number of trials the realization ofZ m is in U, it is overwhelmingly likely that this realization is one that achieves as small a value of R as possible given this constraint; thus, the rate of decay is determined by this smallest value.
Discrete Choice and Unlikelihood Functions
Consider an agent who must choose among a set of n actions. The payoff to action i is the sum of the fixed base payoff π i and the random shockZ . The agent chooses the action that is optimal ex post.
2 These properties of the Cramér transform and Cramér's Theorem can be found in Section 2.2 of Dembo and Zeitouni (1998) . In particular, the finiteness, strict convexity, and smoothness of R on the interior of its domain follow from the assumptions that Z l has convex support and that its moment generating function exists-see Exercises 2.2.24 and 2.2.39 in Dembo and Zeitouni (1998) .
The probabilities with which the agent chooses each action are described by the choice probability function C m :
In the last expression, D i ∈ R n×n is the matrix 1e i − I, where e i is the ith standard basis vector and 1 the vector of ones, so that (
Define the unlikelihood function Υ :
In rough terms, equation (2) (π) as m grows large. By Cramér's Theorem, the unlikelihood Υ i (π) can be computed as (ii) Υ i (π) is nonincreasing in π i and is nondecreasing in π j for j i.
Proof. Parts (i) and (ii) are immediate. Since the objective function in program (3) is convex, and since the function defining the program's constraints is linear in the vector (z, π) ∈ R 2n , part (iii) follows from Mangasarian and Rosen (1964, Lemma 1).
Proposition 2.4. Suppose that C
where
and where z * i is the unique solution to
Proof. In the Appendix.
In Proposition 2.4, the vector z * represents the realization of the average shock vector Z m that is "least unlikely" among those that make action i optimal. To explain the form that z * takes, it is convenient to focus on the case in which each component Z l k of the shock vector Z l has mean µ k = 0. 3 In this case, the proposition implies that if action i was not optimal ex ante, then the shock z * i must be positive, the shocks to worse-performing actions must be zero, and the shock to each better-performing action j may be either zero or negative, according to whether or not z * i is large enough to compensate for the base payoff deficit π j − π i . If it is not, the negative payoff shock z * j ensures that i and j have the same ex post payoff. Finally, the positive shock value z * i is chosen so that the marginal reduction in unlikelihood that would result from lowering z * i is exactly offset by the marginal increases in unlikelihood that would result from lowering the negative values of z * j by the same amount.
The Multinomial Probit Model
Because the average of m independent normal random variables is itself normally distributed, our discrete choice model includes MW's multinomial probit model as a special case. Indeed, because the Cramér transform for a N(0, σ 2 ) random variable is the
2σ 2 , the vector z * from Proposition 2.4 takes a particularly simple form: since r k (z k ) = z k σ 2 , the first-order condition (6) requires the components of the shock vector z * to have arithmetic mean zero.
This fact and the considerations described after Proposition 2.4 lead to a simple characterization of the unlikelihood function of the multinomial probit model. To present it most concisely we introduce a new definition: for any set K ⊆ S of cardinality n K , we let
denote the average payoff of the actions in K.
3 This is without loss of generality, since one can always eliminate a nonzero mean µ k by replacing component Z 
with the set J ⊂ S − {i} being uniquely determined by the requirement that (9) j ∈ J if and only if π j >π J∪{i} .
Thus J is the set of actions with z * j < 0.
Proof.
In the Appendix.
MW analyze the rates of decay of choice probabilities in the multinomial probit model by directly evaluating the limit of the relevant multiple integral. Their Proposition 1 states that these rates take the form described in equations (7) and (8) above, but with the set J ∪ {i} being replaced by the set of all actions whose base payoffs are at least π i . In contrast, Proposition 2.5 requires J to contain only those actions whose payoffs are sufficiently larger than π i to make a positive contribution to the average payoff of actions in J ∪ {i}. Among other things, this ensures that equation (8) does not assign any action other than i a positive payoff shock. 4 We illustrate these points through a simple example. , then the base payoff deficit of action 1 relative to action 3, π 1 − π 3 = −c, is already fully addressed by the positive shock to action 1, z 1 = b+c 3 > c. Indeed, the shock to action 3 specified above,
, is positive, which can only be counterproductive. In fact, when c < b 2 , Proposition 2.5 tells us that the optimal choice of z is still z * = (
. More generally, Proposition 2.5 shows that when b and c are positive,
and
if c > 2b.
Exponentially Distributed Payoff Shocks
We have seen that when payoff shocks are normally distributed, the components of the shock vector z * have arithmetic mean equal to µ k = 0, so that the positive payoff shock to strategy i is equal in absolute value to the sum of the negative payoff shocks to strategies with sufficiently higher base payoffs. For instance, when n = 2 and π j > π i , the z * used to determine Υ i (π) is given by z * If instead the payoff shocks follow an exponential(λ) distribution, then the fact that this distribution has no left tail suggests that the shock vector z * should take a less symmetric form. Indeed, since the relevant Cramér transform is r k (z k ) = λz k − 1 − log λz k , realizations ofZ m i that are significantly above the mean shock λ −1 (which thus have r i (z i ) ≈ λz i − 1) are far less uncommon than realizations ofZ m j that are below λ −1 to a similar extent (and which thus have r j (z j ) ≈ −log λz j ); of course, negative realizations ofZ m j are impossible. Proposition 2.7 shows that the correct asymmetric treatment of above-and belowaverage shocks can be expressed in a surprisingly simple form: with exponential payoff shocks, the harmonic mean of the components of z * , 5 H (z * ) = n n k=1 1 z * k , must be equated to mean payoff shock µ k = λ −1 .
Proposition 2.7. Suppose that components of the random vector Z l are independent, each with
